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Abstract: Prior research demonstrates a willingness to incur costs to punish norm 
violators. But, how strong are the motives underlying such acts? Will people rely on 
“excuses” to avoid acting on costly punishment intentions, as with other costly pro-social 
acts? In a laboratory experiment, we find that third parties punish reluctantly: they state a 
preference to punish, but avoid the opportunity when doing so does not reveal this as their 
preference. In contrast, second parties—those directly wronged—are resolute punishers: 
they actively seek out the opportunity to punish. Our findings highlight important 
differences in motives underlying second- and third-party punishment.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies provide evidence that individuals’ willingness to incur a cost to punish anti-
social actions is one mechanism through which societies can promote pro-social behavior 
(Yamagishi, 1986; Henrish et al., 2006; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; 
Carpenter and Mattews, 2012; Charness et al., 2008). However, identifying the exact role of 
voluntary punishment in promoting cooperation and pro-sociality requires an improved 
understanding of the robustness of punishment behavior. Recent research on “moral wiggle 
room” and “reluctant altruism” show altruistic behavior—such as charitable giving—diminishes 
significantly if people can avoid the opportunity to give or possess excuses for not giving (Dana 
et al, 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Dana et al., 2007; Haisley and Weber, 2010; Andreoni et al., 
2011; Lazear et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al., 2012). These findings raise important questions for 
human social behavior more broadly (Malmendier et al., 2014).  
In this paper, we investigate to what extent reluctance also applies to costly punishment. 
That is, when people are provided with opportunities to avoid engaging in costly punishment, 
without having to explicitly state that they do not want to punish, does the frequency of 
punishment of norm violation decrease? Moreover, how does the answer to this question vary by 
whether the punisher is an independent outsider (third party) or a victim (second party) of the 
original transgression? The extent to which economic agents are reluctant punishers may provide 
insights into when we are likely to observe punishment in natural contexts and into whether 
voluntary punishment can be an effective instrument for supporting pro-social and efficiency 
enhancing behavior.  
On one hand, people may be resolute punishers of wrongdoing in the sense that they 
derive positive utility from punishing those who transgress norms, even when doing so is costly 
and it is possible to avoid the punishment opportunity. Hence, for some people, the satisfaction 
from punishing wrongdoing may exceed the costs of actually carrying out the punishment, thus 
making these people steadfast in seeing through punishment opportunities. For example, it may 
be that observing anti-social behavior arouses negative emotions such as anger, which may be 
relieved through the act of punishing. Although behavioral and neuro-imaging studies show that 
people feel angry when being treated unfairly and that such negative emotion triggers second-
party punishment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005), the role 
of anger in third-party punishment remains unclear (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Batson et al., 2007).  
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On the other hand, people facing the opportunity to punish wrongdoers may be reluctant 
punishers because they feel obligated to do so by social and ethical norms. A social obligation to 
punish may explain findings that publicity and anticipated guilt increase third party punishment 
behavior (Kurzban et al., 2007; Piazza and Bering, 2008). The desire to be respected and 
evaluated positively by both others and even one's self can provide a unifying interpretation for 
complex aspects of human pro-social behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 
2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2012).1 When punishing misconduct 
is socially desirable, an individual might feel compelled to incur costs to punish wrongdoers, 
without really wanting to do so. In view of the extensive literature demonstrating reluctance in 
other costly pro-social behaviors, costly punishment, especially third party punishment, might 
also be reluctant and therefore sensitive to whether potential punishers can hide behind 
circumstances that allow them to avoid the punishment opportunity.  
To test and compare the robustness of punishment behavior of both second and third 
parties, we conducted three variants of a dictator game experiment with punishment 
opportunities. Our primary purpose was to examine the extent to which third parties, as 
compared with second parties, choose to capitalize on an opportunity to secretly limit their 
ability to act on a stated intention to punish a wrongdoer. That is, to what extent do second- and 
third-party punishers demonstrate reluctance or resoluteness in their punishment behavior, when 
confronted with an opportunity to avoid having to carry out a costly punishment act while 
“saving face” by nevertheless expressing an intention to punish? 
Previous laboratory experiments studying voluntary punishment typically provide 
decision makers with clear choices (e.g., how much to punish) and direct mappings from choices 
into outcomes. Our experiment differs from these previous experiments in that we allow the 
decision maker to indicate the intention to punish but to also subsequently manipulate the ability 
to punish without doing so transparently. Specifically, we allow a random outcome to determine 
whether punishment decisions can actually be enacted, and let those making the punishment 
decisions secretly misreport the random outcome. By doing so, our experiment allows us to 
examine the extent to which punishing behavior is reluctant or resolute. In our experiment, a 
                                                            
1 Van der Weele et al. (2014) show that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the reciprocal behavior in a 
context involving positive reciprocity—specifically a trust game—and argue that image concerns are not a key 
driver of reciprocal behavior. In contrast, Malmendier et al. (2014) find evidence of reluctance in reciprocal 
behavior that is similar in magnitude to the reluctance in one-sided dictator games. 
 
 
3 
resolute punisher will actively seek the opportunity to punish, even if punishment is costly; a 
reluctant punisher, after demonstrating the intention to punish, will try to avoid the opportunity 
to implement costly punishment when excuses for doing so are available. This design is a step 
closer to many natural settings in which individuals can often manipulate the circumstances and 
context—for example, by deciding whether to place themselves into situations where an act is 
possible or by manipulating their information prior to making a decision (Dana et al, 2006; Dana 
et al., 2007; Lazear et al, 2012). Thus, in many natural settings, those with the ability to punish 
others may be able to hide behind the possibility that they are not aware of a transgression or do 
not have the ability to punish.  
Our experimental findings provide clear evidence for the reluctance of third-party 
punishment and for the resoluteness of second-party punishment. Many third parties who express 
a willingness to engage in costly punishment nevertheless exploit loopholes in the environment 
in order to avoid actually having to carry out the punishment act. However, second parties 
exhibit the opposite pattern in their behavior—they resolutely seek out the ability to punish, 
going as far as to misreport random outcomes in order to ensure that the punishment act is 
carried out.  
Our findings yield two important points regarding the punishment behavior of economic 
agents. First, while second- and third-party punishment are often discussed as manifestations of 
similar preferences—e.g., a desire to sanction norm violations—we find that the precise nature of 
the motives underlying both behaviors may be quite distinct. Punishment by those who have 
been personally wronged may reflect more of a “true” or “internal” preference, while punishment 
on behalf of others appears driven more by external considerations, such as social pressure or 
image concerns. Second, our findings also raise important issues for the design of institutions in 
which second- and third-party punishment are possible, but where people may have the ability to 
avoid the opportunity or obligation to punish. When such punishment is socially desirable, the 
reluctance of punishment by third parties may make it infrequent and may diminish the extent to 
which it is an instrument that discourages anti-social behavior. Conversely, however, retaliation 
by those personally wronged may be widespread—and may even occur in situations where it is 
socially undesirable (Houser and Xiao, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
4 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiment uses similar procedures as in other prior experiments on second- and third-party 
punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) and consists of two stages. In Stage 1 (the dictator 
game stage), one party has the option to voluntarily share or not share with a second party. Stage 
2 (the punishment stage) consists of two parts. In the first part, the opportunity to punish the first 
party—at a cost—is offered to either the directly affected second party or to a neutral third party, 
depending on the treatment condition. In the second part of the punishment stage, a random 
process determines whether the punishment decision in the first part is implemented. However, 
our two main treatments provide subjects the opportunity to misreport the random outcome, 
thereby avoiding having to carry out the costly punishment.  
 
2.1 Experimental Conditions 
The experiment consists of two principal experimental conditions: third-party 
punishment with self report (3P Self Report) and second-party punishment with self report (2P 
Self Report).2 In addition, we conducted a control condition, third-party punishment with 
verification (3P Verified), to address a potential interpretation of behavior in the 3P Self Report 
condition.  
In the first condition, 3P Self Report, three parties form a group. Group members make 
decisions across two stages.  
In Stage 1, the first party (Participant A) has the opportunity to act fairly or unfairly 
toward the second party (Participant B), in allocating 100 points between the two participants. In 
each group, Participant A decides whether to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 points to Participant B, 
keeping the remainder of the 100 points for him or herself. A third party (Participant C) receives 
a fixed amount of 50 points. Points are worth 10 cents each.  
Stage 2 is the punishment stage and consists of two parts. In the first part, we elicit 
punishment strategies from Participant C. Specifically, for each of the possible actions taken by 
the first party in the first stage, Participant C chooses how many deduction points (between 0 and 
50) to assign to Participant A. Following Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), each assigned deduction 
point reduces Participant C’s final earnings by one point and Participant A's final earnings by 
three points. Participant B's earnings are unaffected by Participant C's punishment decision. Such 
                                                            
2 Instructions are provided in the Appendix. 
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designs have previously demonstrated a willingness to punish among significant proportions of 
third parties. 
The novel feature of our design is the second part of Stage 2. This part mimics aspects of 
many natural environments, whereby a third party may not have the opportunity to actually carry 
out the intent to punish a wrongdoer. For example, a transgressor may escape before the third 
party can act, or a third party may simply not observe or be aware of the transgression. 
Moreover, such contextual features may also allow third parties the possibility of 
misrepresenting whether they are actually limited in their ability to punish—or to “turn a blind 
eye” to a potentially punishable transgression. 
We implement this feature in the second part of Stage 2 by having the third party roll a 
die to determine whether or not the punishment decision made in the first part of Stage 2 is 
actually enacted. In particular, each Participant C receives a cup with a die inside. The 
experimenter then announces publicly, "If you are Participant C, please roll the die privately in 
your cup at least five times to verify that it is a fair six-sided die. Once you have rolled it enough 
times to be satisfied it is a fair die, roll it privately one more time. You do not need to announce 
when you are rolling for the final time. Then report the result of your final roll below and click 
the ‘Submit’ button.” 
Participants were told that an even number in the final roll corresponds to states of the 
world in which the punishment is actually carried out, while an odd number creates outcomes in 
which no punishment is enacted and the third party incurs no cost. Thus, if Participant C rolls 
and reports the results in an unbiased manner, then there is a 50% probability that any attempt to 
punish by Participant C is irrelevant and the outcome is identical to one in which there is no 
possibility of punishment.3  
Participant C knew, when making a punishment decision in the first part of Stage 2, that a 
self-reported die roll would determine whether the punishment decision would be implemented. 
Hence, the inclusion of the second part allows third parties the opportunity to represent a desire 
to punish a transgressor (despite the cost) in the first part of Stage 2, while manipulating the 
outcome of the die roll so the costly punishment does not actually take place and the third party 
                                                            
3 Importantly, Participant C is asked to roll the die several times privately, to decide when to roll one final time, and 
to only report the outcome of the last die roll. That is, Participant C can decide privately and independently when to 
stop, and which die roll will “count.” This design feature is intended to facilitate Participant C’s reporting of his or 
her preferred outcome (Shalvi et al., 2011). 
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incurs no cost. Note that we are never able to observe whether the die roll reported by a 
particular subject is truthful. However, by comparing the distribution of reported die rolls to the 
known distribution of outcomes of a fair die, we can identify whether the third parties are 
intentionally avoiding or seeking out the ability to enact costly punishment by selectively 
reporting the die roll outcomes that they prefer (Fischbacher and Heusi-Follmi, 2003; Shalvi et 
al., 2011). Specifically, a resolute punisher can specify the decision to incur the cost to punish 
and then report an even number, regardless of the actual die roll, to ensure that it is implemented. 
Conversely, a reluctant punisher can report a desire to punish but then also report an odd-
numbered outcome for the die roll.  
Of course, a preference for acting honestly may prevent an individual from misreporting 
the die roll. Therefore, for example, even if all third parties are reluctant punishers, we might 
observe less than 100 percent of punishing third parties reporting odd numbers simply because 
some reluctant punishers are also unwilling to lie for these stakes. Similarly, resolute punishers 
may not always report even numbers if doing so is perceived as a lie. Hence, we expect the 
proportion of realized odd die rolls to lie between 50 and 100 percent for reluctant punishers and 
between 0 and 50 percent for resolute punishers. For the purpose of our study, the key statistic 
for uncovering whether punishment is, on average, resolute or reluctant is whether the reported 
proportion of even rolls lies significantly above or below 50 percent. 
Our other principal condition, second party with self-report (2P Self Report), is a 
modification of 3P Self Report that allows us to explore the extent to which second-party 
punishment is resolute or reluctant—i.e., whether it is similarly sensitive to the opportunity to 
avoid acting on a stated preference for punishment. In 2P Self Report, there is no third party 
(Participant C), and it is Participant B who has the opportunity to specify punishment for 
Participant A and then privately roll a die in Stage 2. Hence, Participant B serves the role of both 
recipient of the Stage 1 decision and potential punisher in Stage 2. The punishment decision and 
die roll are otherwise identical to those in the 3P Self Report condition. As with 3P Self Report, 
the distribution of die rolls reported in 2P Self Report informs of us the nature of the punishment 
decisions. A reluctant punisher may use the private die roll opportunity to report an odd-
numbered outcome, and thereby avoid having to punish, while a resolute punisher determined to 
see the punishment through will report an even-numbered outcome.  
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Finally, we note that an alternative interpretation of a high proportion of reported odd-
numbered die outcomes is that individuals who would normally not incur a cost to punish state 
otherwise in order to voice their (costless) disapproval of the first party's actions (Xiao and 
Houser, 2005). They can guarantee that signaling such disapproval is costless by reporting an 
odd-numbered outcome for the die roll in the implementation part. Thus, under this 
interpretation, a low frequency of even numbers reported does not inform us of the true 
preferences of the people who would otherwise punish, but instead reflects the actions of people 
who would not punish if there was no opportunity to misreport the die roll and who now claim 
that they would punish simply because they can get out of it. A key prediction under this 
interpretation is that the proportion of subjects who indicate a willingness to punish should be 
significantly higher when they can subsequently misreport the outcome of the die roll than when 
they cannot.  
 We report below that there is a high proportion of reported odd rolls in the 3P Self Report 
condition but not in the 2P Self Report condition. It is therefore important to address this 
possible explanation for the 3P Self Report results. For this reason, we conducted an additional 
treatment, third party with verification (3P Verified). The only difference between the 3P Self 
Report and 3P Verified conditions is that, in the latter, the experimenter visually observed the 
third party's die roll and entered it into the computer. Hence, there was no opportunity to 
manipulate the outcome of the die roll. All subjects knew this in advance of their decisions. 
 
2.2 General Procedures 
We conducted experimental sessions at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(P.E.E.L.). We used 461 participants, who were mostly students from the University of 
Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University. Subjects signed up for sessions through an online 
system maintained by the laboratory administrator.  
We targeted approximately 60 subjects in the role of punishers in each condition, but the 
actual number of observations varied slightly based on variance in recruiting and in the number 
of participants attending sessions. Specifically, we conducted 10 sessions of the 3P Self Report 
condition and 9 sessions of the 3P Verified condition, each with 18 subjects (6 groups) except for 
one session in 3P Self Report with only 12 subjects and one session in the 3P Verified with 21 
subjects. This resulted in a total of 174 subjects (58 punishers) in the 3P Self Report condition 
 
 
8 
and 165 (55 punishers) in the 3P Verified condition. We conducted 7 sessions of the 2P Self 
Report condition, each including between five and eleven pairs, for a total of 122 subjects (61 
punishers).4 Each session lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
 Once all subjects had arrived for the session and completed consent forms, the 
experimenter handed out envelopes with enclosed cards indicating a role for the subject. In the 
two conditions with third-party punishment (3P Self Report and 3P Verified), roles were labeled 
A, B and C, and corresponded to first-party (dictator), second-party (receiver), and third party 
(punisher). The 2P Self Report condition only included roles A and B, as the functions of 
receiver and punisher were combined. The experimenter then directed subjects to assigned seats 
corresponding to their role—i.e., all subjects in role A were directed to choose a seat in one 
cluster of computers, those in role B to another cluster and, where necessary, those in role C to a 
third cluster. Subjects could therefore identify who was in which role, but never knew with 
whom in the other two roles they were matched in a group. The experimenter then distributed the 
instructions and read them aloud. Subjects received instructions for both stages of the experiment 
before making any choices. 
 The experiment was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Through 
the computer interface, subjects first completed a quiz to verify understanding of the instructions 
before making any decisions. During this time, an experimenter answered questions privately. 
Once all subjects successfully completed the quiz, the computer monitor showed them the 
decision screens relevant to their role. Subjects in the role of dictator made their allocation 
decisions. Then, subjects in the role of punisher specified, for each possible amount shared by 
the dictator, how many deduction points to assign. Once all punishment strategies were elicited, 
the experimenter distributed to each punisher a die inside a cup and reminded them to use this 
die to determine whether the punishment decision would be implemented. In the 3P Verified 
condition, the experimenter went to each subject in the role of punisher sequentially, observed 
the die roll, and entered this outcome into the computer. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects saw the decisions, reported die roll, and final 
outcome for their group, but received no information on what happened in other groups. Each 
subject completed a questionnaire before being paid privately by the experimenter. Subjects were 
                                                            
4 These numbers exclude one pair in the 2P Self Report condition in which the subject in the role of Participant B 
opted to leave the experiment after the instructions were completed but before any decisions were made. 
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informed during the instructions that in the event that a player ended the experiment with 
negative points, the negative earnings would be deducted from the $8 payment each subject 
received for participating in the experiment.5 
 
3. Results 
Our primary interest is in the frequencies with which subjects with the possibility to punish state 
the intention to do so, and subsequently enact the stated punishment decision in the conditions 
with self-reported die rolls. Providing an overview of the results, Figure 1 presents the 
frequencies of stated punishment intentions and enacted punishment across the three treatment 
conditions. 
 
Fig. 1. The stated and enacted punishment by potential punishers in each of the three treatments. 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 Including the participation payment, mean earnings in the 2P Self Report condition were $14.25 for the first party 
and $9.70 for the second party. Means earnings in the 3P Self Report condition were $17.18 for the first party, $8.69 
for the second party, and $12.96 for the third party. Mean earnings in the 3P Verified condition were $16.41 for the 
first party, $8.89 for the second party, and $12.77 for the third party.  
39.7
8.6
34.5
17.3
57.4
39.3
0
20
40
60
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f P
ot
en
tia
l P
un
ish
er
s
 
3P Self Report 3P Verified 2P Self Report
Note: In the 3P Verified treatment, we show the punishment enacted in expectation (50%).
Stated and Enacted Punishment by Treatment
Punishment Stated Punishment Enacted
 
 
10 
 
3.1 Robustness of Third-party Punishment 
Our first finding is that reluctance appears to be a central component of third-party punishment, 
as evidenced by the unusually low frequency of reported even die-roll outcomes. Of the 58 
Participants C in the 3P Self Report condition, 23 (39.7 percent) made the initial decision, in 
Stage 2, to punish (at a cost to themselves) at least one of the potential actions of the first party.6 
If they were reporting die roll outcomes as the result of a natural and unbiased random process, 
we would expect 50% of these subjects to report an even number. However, only 5 of 23 third 
parties (21.7%) reported rolling an even number, which is statistically unlikely from an unbiased 
random process (p < 0.02 in a binomial test). Thus, consistent with reluctance in third party 
punishment, we find that third parties who expressed a willingness to incur costs to punish 
transgressing first parties also tended to misrepresent the outcome of the die roll in a manner that 
“prevented” them from being able to actually implement this costly action. As a result of such 
reluctance, and the manipulation opportunity afforded by the private die roll, third party 
punishment is rare in the 3P Self Report condition: only 5 of 58 third parties (8.6 percent) 
effectively implemented punishment of the first party. 
In addition to reluctance, another possible interpretation of the high frequency of reported 
odd rolls is that some Participants C who would not otherwise choose to incur a cost to punish 
Participants A in Stage 2 can now do so costlessly—e.g., to express their disapproval—by 
simply reporting an odd die roll outcome in the second part of Stage 2. Data from the 3P Verified 
treatment do not support this alternative explanation. We find that 19 of 55 (34.5%) Participants 
C in this condition chose to punish at least one of the actions of the first party, which is very 
close to and does not significantly differ from the 39.7 percent who chose to punish in the 3P 
Self Report condition (χ2=.32, p=0.57). The punishment rate of 34.5 percent in the 3P Verified 
treatment implies an expected effective punishment rate of 17.3 percent—one half of the total 
choosing to punish—which is twice as high as the effective punishment rate by third parties in 
the 3P Self Report condition (8.6 percent).  
Hence, the low rate of reported even rolls in 3P Self Report does not appear to be driven 
by Participants C indicating they would punish because they knew they could avoid it 
                                                            
6 This frequency of costly third party punishment is lower than has been found in some prior experiments. For 
example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found 61% of third parties (and 74% of second parties) were willing to 
punish unfair actions. 
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subsequently. Most of the difference in behavior between these two conditions lies in the 
implementation of the punishment, rather than in the statement of an intention to punish. This is 
further supported by regression analyses, discussed in Section 3.3, which show that the verified 
die roll has no significant effect on third parties’ Stage 2 probability of stating a preference for 
punishment, the average amount of punishment among those that do punish, or their sensitivity 
to the amount Participant A gives. That is, the stated punishment intention is very similar 
between the 3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions. Therefore, we attribute the approximate 
halving of enacted punishment to the fact that Participants C had the ability to act on their true 
preferences. That is, the veil of randomness provided by the die roll shields reluctant punishers 
from social image concerns and allows them to “turn a blind eye” to the first party’s 
transgression, thus circumventing the responsibility to punish.  
 
3.2 Robustness of Second-party Punishment 
The 2P Self Report condition allows us to explore the extent to which second-party punishment 
is resolute or reluctant—i.e., whether it is similarly sensitive to the opportunity to avoid acting on 
a stated preference for punishment, as is the case with third-party punishment. As shown in 
Figure 1, 35 of 61 (57.4 percent) second parties chose to punish at least one of the possible 
actions by the first party. Of these 35 subjects who elected to punish, 24 (68.6 percent) reported 
rolling an even number and therefore had their punishment decision enacted. This proportion is 
statistically significantly greater than the 50 percent we would expect if second parties were 
honestly reporting the outcome of the die roll (p < 0.05 in a binomial test). Thus, second-party 
punishers appear resolute in their desire to punish, in contrast with the reluctance exhibited by 
third parties. Not only do they not use the die roll as an excuse to avoid implementing the 
punishment, some of the second parties even appear to be willing to misreport the die roll to 
ensure the punishment is enacted. 
 
3.3 Punishment Amounts 
In addition to the decision of whether to punish, we also examine the punishment amount 
assigned by second- or third-party punishers. Figure 2 plots the mean stated punishment 
expenditures, for those subjects who indicated a willingness to punish at least one of the possible 
decisions by Participant A. There is a clear difference in the punishment intensity between 
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second and third parties. Specifically, for all actions by Participant A that depart from fairness, 
second parties who punish do so more intensely, on average, than do third parties. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Stated punishment expenditures by third-party subjects (Participant C) who expressed a 
preference for punishing at least one possible action by Participant A. 
 
 
 
 
Importantly, when we look at punishment amounts in the two versions of the experiment 
with third-party punishment, we do not observe a difference between the punishment behavior of 
those third parties whose die rolls would be verified (3P Verified) and those who were free to 
report any outcome (3P Self Report). This supports our earlier conclusion that expressed third 
party intentions do not differ between the two conditions. 
Further evidence that the ability to subsequently reverse stated punishment intentions did 
not influence punishment behavior is observed when comparing those who ultimately reported 
the ability to punish (even-numbered die rolls) with those who ultimately reported an inability to 
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punish (odd-numbered die rolls). Figure 2 reveals no differences in intended intensity of 
punishment for the two groups. This is not surprising for the 3P Verified condition, in which the 
ability to punish was determined truly randomly. However, for the 3P Self Report and 2P Self 
Report conditions, the lack of a difference is meaningful. Specifically, it indicates that the 
decision of whether and how much to punish, made in the first part of Stage 2, is not influenced 
by whether one is likely to ultimately avoid implementing the punishment.  
 
 
Table 1: Punishment Decisions and Die Rolls in Self-Report Treatments 
 
Stage 2 decisions 
First part Second part 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Probability of 
punishing 
Magnitude of 
punishment 
Enact 
Punishment 
Enact 
Punishment 
2ndParty – Self Report 0.171** (0.0822) 
30.90*** 
(10.38) 
0.468*** 
(0.116) 
0.433** 
(0.183) 
Amount given by Participant A -0.0053*** (0.0013) 
-1.125** 
(0.531)   
Amount given by Participant A 
X 2P Self Report 
0.0002 
(0.0019) 
-0.174 
(0.488)   
Mean Punishment Expenditure    -0.0097 (0.0216) 
Mean Punishment Expenditure  
X 2P Self Report    
0.0009 
(0.0233) 
Constant  
-3.079 
(12.57)   
Observations 714 223 58 58 
Log pseudolikelihood -418.35 -806.75 -33.83 -33.72 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0564  0.1585 0.1614 
 
Models include 3P Self Report and 2P Self Report conditions only; models 1, 3, and 4 report the marginal effects at 
the mean as calculated by a probit regression; model 2 reports the results of a truncated linear regression of 
punishment amount; models 1 and 2 show robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by subject) while models 
3 and 4 use the subject as the unit of analysis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
3.3. Modeling the Punishment and Die Roll Decisions 
We next model the punishment and die-roll-reporting decisions, using regression analysis, as a 
way of understanding the statistical relationships observed in Figures 1 and 2. Table 1 compares 
the behavior of punishers in the two conditions with self-reported die roll outcomes (3P Self 
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Report and 2P Self Report). Models 1 and 2 address the decision of whether and how much to 
punish in the first part of Stage 2. Then, in models 3 and 4, we analyze the subsequent second 
part decision regarding reporting of the die roll.  
Because the decision of whether to punish a wrongdoer is logically separable from the 
choice of the amount of punishment, we model the Stage 2 punishment decisions of our subjects 
in two stages. Such a hurdle model (Erkal et al., 2011) first examines the binary outcome of 
punishing or not punishing and then, if punishment is chosen, independently estimates the 
determinants of the amount of punishment selected. Because each subject makes six punishment 
decisions, one for each possible choice by Participant A, we cluster standard errors at the subject 
level.  
 In the first stage of the hurdle model (Table 1, model 1), we estimate a probit regression 
of the stated intention to punish on a binary variable identifying the 2P Self Report treatment, the 
amount that Participant A gives to Participant B (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50), and the interactions 
between these. The dependent variable is the binary decision of whether to punish (1) or not (0), 
and the coefficients report marginal effects. The 3P Self Report condition is the baseline against 
which the coefficient for 2nd Party Self Report measures differences. The results reveal that 
second parties are significantly more likely, by 17 percentage points, to state a preference for 
punishment when Participant A gives zero. As expected, we also observe that as the amount 
given by Participant A increases, the probability of punishing decreases. The sensitivity to giving 
by Participant A does not significantly differ between the 3P Self Report and 2P Self Report 
conditions. 
 The second stage of the hurdle model (Table 1, model 2) consists of a truncated linear 
regression of the punishment amount on the same independent variables. Here, we observe that, 
relative to third parties, second parties assign more deduction points to Participant A. More 
punishment points are assigned to those Participants A who shared less. However, we again 
observe that punishment is not significantly more sensitive to initial sharing for second parties 
than for third parties.  
 Models 3 and 4 study punishment enactment in the second part of Stage 2 (i.e., self-
reported die rolls) for the 58 subjects who chose to punish in the first part (23 subjects in 3P Self 
Report and 35 in 2P Self Report). We confirm that second parties who chose to punish are 
significantly more likely, by 47 percentage points, to report die rolls that lead to punishment 
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being enacted. In neither self-report treatment is the mean punishment expenditure significantly 
predictive of whether punishment is enacted. That is, consistent with Figure 2, those people who 
subsequently enacted punishment did not systematically indicate higher or lower punishment 
amounts in the first part of Stage 2. 
 The conclusion of this analysis is that there are significant differences in whether and 
how second and third parties enact costly punishment. Second parties punish both more 
frequently and more intensively.7 More importantly, for our purposes, they are more resolute in 
their punishment—they report many more die roll outcomes that allow the punishment decision 
to be enacted.  
 
 
Table 2: Punishment Decisions and Die Rolls in Third Party Treatments 
  (1) (2) 
 
Probability of 
punishing 
Magnitude of 
punishment 
3rdParty – Verified -0.0574 (0.0765) 
-9.691 
(20.04) 
Amount given by Participant A -0.0044*** (0.0012) 
-1.527 
(1.287) 
Amount given  
X 3P Verified 
0.0019 
(0.0018) 
0.348 
(0.930) 
Constant  
-14.77 
(38.52) 
Observations 678 147 
Log pseudolikelihood -346.93 -485.60 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0213  	  
Model 1 reports the marginal effects at the mean as calculated by a probit regression; model 2 reports the results of a 
truncated linear regression of punishment amount; models include 3P_SR and 3P_V conditions only; robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by subject); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
We also compare behavior in the two third-party punishment treatments, which vary 
based on whether the third party enacting the punishment can misreport the die roll (3P Self 
Report) or can not do so (3P Verified). Table 2 presents the hurdle model of the decision, in the 
                                                            
7 First parties (dictators) seem to anticipate this difference. While their behavior does not significantly differ 
between the 3P Self Report and 3P Verified treatments (χ2, p=.71), in the 2P Self Report treatment, dictators act 
more generously (χ2, p<.01). While 64% of dictators give zero in the third party treatments, only 26% do so in 2P 
Self Report. The mean amount given in 3P Self Report and 3P Verified are 6.9 and 8.9, respectively, while the mean 
amount given in 2P Self Report is 22.1 (p<.001 for comparison to each 3P treatment). 
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first part of Stage 2, of whether or not to punish and, conditionally on doing so, of how much to 
punish. Consistent with our earlier analysis, we observe no significant difference between the 
two versions of the experiment with third-party punishers. While the probability of a third party 
punishing is sensitive to the amount given by Participant A, this sensitivity does not significantly 
depend on whether they will later be able to manipulate the outcome of the die roll (model 1).  
Similarly, the amount of punishment chosen by third parties does not depend on whether the die 
roll will be verified (model 2). Overall, the results in Table 2 provide strong support for our 
earlier observation that the decision of whether to state an intention to punish is not affected by 
whether the third party will subsequently have the opportunity to avoid implementing this 
decision by misreporting the die roll outcome. 
 
4. Discussion 
We provide evidence that the decisions of third parties to punish wrongdoers are often reluctant. 
That is, third parties who state an intention to punish norm transgressors often capitalize on the 
ability to avoid actually implementing the costly punishment act. In contrast, we find that 
second-party punishment is resolute. Second parties are not only more likely to pay a cost to 
punish the wrongdoer, but they also seek out the opportunity to implement punishment and this 
desire is sufficiently strong to induce some subjects to manipulate otherwise random events in 
order to ensure that punishment is implemented. 
 Our work highlights the need to better understand the deeper motives underlying social 
behavior (Malmendier et al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2007). In the case of resolute versus reluctant 
punishment, one possibility is that the primary motivators for third-party (often reluctant) 
punishment tend to be extrinsic, higher-order, socially constructed concepts such as image or 
duty, which can be actively managed and manipulated in self-interested ways. Resolute second-
party punishment, on the other hand, may be more intrinsically motivated, perhaps driven by 
emotions like anger. 
Our findings also illuminate recent discussions on the difference between punishment 
observed in the lab and in the field (Guala, 2012; Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012). Cooperation 
in a society that relies heavily on spontaneous third-party punishment may not be sustainable if 
situations arise in which individuals responsible for implementing punishment, and bearing its 
costs, have the ability to escape this social burden in a manner that also allows them to save face. 
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The comparisons between 3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions further suggests that 
exogenously enforcing the implementation of punishment intentions will not change the initial 
stated severity of punishment on wrongdoings. An implication of these findings is that it may be 
beneficial for a society to eliminate the opportunities that excuse otherwise uninvolved third 
parties from the responsibility of defending social order. In some cases it may require additional 
incentives, such as rewards or legal obligations, for people to take costly actions to voluntarily 
sanction norm violations, even when they are not directly impacted by a transgression. The 
presence of formal legal institutions established for controlling misbehavior may serve precisely 
this function.  
On the other hand, the greater resoluteness of second-party punishment reveals that those 
directly wronged by a transgression are willing to bend moral rules—in our case, dishonestly 
reporting the outcome of a die roll—to ensure the enactment of punishment. Hence, this suggests 
institutions should be designed to ensure that, for instance, such a resolute motive does not 
compromise efficiency (Dreber et al., 2008; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Egas and Riedl, 
2008; Xiao and Kunreuther, forthcoming) and lead to escalation of conflicts.  
More broadly, our results highlight the importance of better understanding the motives 
that underlie different forms of pro-social behavior, in order to more accurately understand the 
impacts they are likely to have on society. While the willingness to incur costs to punish norm 
violators appears to be a robust phenomenon in settings where such a preference is directly 
elicited, our findings indicate that studying the extent to which such a stated preference actually 
ends up impacting social outcomes requires using more complex choices that shed light on the 
reluctance or resoluteness underlying such apparent preferences. 
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Appendix: Instructions (3rd Party) 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  
 
In addition to a $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment, you will be paid any money 
you accumulate from the experiment that will be described to you in a moment. You will be paid 
privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an 
experimenter to come to you.  Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules will be asked 
to leave the experiment and will not be paid their earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, payoffs will be expressed in points, not dollars. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points. 
 
In this experiment, there are three types of participants: Participants A, Participants B, and 
Participants C. The computer will randomly and anonymously match participants into groups of 
three with one participant of each type. You will never be informed of the identity of the two 
people with whom you are matched, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, the two 
other participants in your group will never be informed of your identity. You will be in the same 
three-person group for the entire experiment. 
 
Today’s experiment consists of two stages. Any money that you earn from the experiment will 
be added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment. At the conclusion of the 
second stage, the experiment will end and you will receive your earnings in cash.  
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Stage 1 Instructions 
 
At the beginning of this stage, the participants will receive the following number of points: 
• Participant A: 100 points 
• Participant B: 0 points 
• Participant C: 50 points 
 
In this stage, only Participant A will make a decision. Participant A will decide how many of the 
100 points to give to Participant B. Participant A can give Participant B between 0 and 50 points 
in increments of 10 points. That is, Participant A can choose to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 
points to Participant B. 
 
For example, if Participant A gives 40 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 60 
points (100 – 40) and Participant B will have 40 points (0 + 40) at the end of this stage. If 
Participant A gives 10 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 90 points (100 – 10) 
and Participant B will have 10 points (0 + 10) at the end of this stage. If Participant A gives 
0 points, Participant A will have 100 points and Participant B will have 0 points at the end 
of this stage. 
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Stage 2 Instructions 
 
In this stage, only Participant C will make decisions.  
 
Assigning deduction points 
 
For each possible amount of points that Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1, 
Participant C will decide how many deduction points he or she would like to assign to Participant 
A. Participant C will make these decisions before knowing Participant A’s actual choice in Stage 
1. Participant C can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points to Participant A. For each 
deduction point that Participant C assigns to Participant A, Participant A’s total number of points 
will be reduced by three and Participant C’s total number of points will be reduced by one.  
 
For example, if Participant C assigns 2 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be 
reduced by 6 points (2x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 2 points. If 
Participant C assigns 19 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be reduced by 57 
points (19x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 19 points.  
 
Participant C will specify how many deduction points to assign to Participant A, for every 
possible amount that Participant A could give to Participant B in Stage 1. These decisions will be 
made on a screen like the one shown below. 
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Implementing the assignment of deduction points 
 
After Participant C specifies the number of deduction points he or she would like to assign to 
Participant A for each possible decision by Participant A, a die roll will be used to determine 
whether or not Participant C’s decision is actually implemented, and whether any deduction 
points are actually assigned to Participant A. 
 
Participant C’s decision will either  
 
• be implemented, in which case the deduction points specified by Participant C, for the 
amount given by Participant A to Participant B, will be deducted from Participant C’s 
total number of points and three times as many points will be deducted from Participant 
A’s total number of points, or  
 
• not be implemented, in which case no points will be deducted from either Participant C or 
Participant A.  
 
Whether the decision is implemented will depend on a die roll reported by Participant C. 
Participant C will receive a paper cup containing a single six-sided die. Participant C will 
privately roll the die inside the cup, meaning that only Participant C will observe the outcome of 
the die roll. Participant C will then report the outcome of the die roll into the computer.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an even number, meaning it is either 2, 4 or 6, Participant C’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will be 
implemented. That is, Participant C’s 50 points will be reduced by the specified number 
of deduction points and Participant A’s total points will be reduced by three times this 
amount.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an odd number, meaning it is either 1, 3 or 5, Participant C’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will not be 
implemented. That is, Participant C will keep his or her entire 50 points and Participant 
A’s total number of points will not be changed. 
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Points Calculation 
 
The final number of points for each participant will be calculated as follows: 
 
If Participant C’s reported die roll is a 2, 4, or 6: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
 + 100 (starting points) 
  -  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
-  3 x Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A by Participant C in Stage 2 
for the corresponding decision made by Participant A.  
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
 + Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
 + 50 (starting points) 
-  Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A in Stage 2 for the corresponding 
decision made by Participant A 
 
 
If Participant C’s reported die roll is a 1, 3, or 5: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
+ 100 (starting points) 
-  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
+ Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
+ 50 (starting points) 
 
Your final number of points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points and 
added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment.  
 
Please note that it is possible for Participant A’s total number of points to be negative. In this 
case, the points will be deducted from Participant A’s participation payment. Additional 
deduction points that would result in net losses greater than the $3 participation payment for 
Participant A will not count against the earnings of either Participant A nor Participant C.  
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Final Results 
 
All decisions will be made through the computer. After all Stages 1 and 2 have finished, a results 
screen will reveal the following information: 
 
• Participant A’s decision of how many points to give to Participant B in Stage 1. 
• Participant C’s choice of deduction points in Stage 2. 
• Participant C’s reported die roll in Stage 2. 
• Your final number of points. 
• Your total earnings for the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions about the instructions?  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, we will now proceed to some 
questions about the instructions, which you will answer on the computer. You may refer to 
these printed instructions if you need to in order to answer the questions.  
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Appendix: Instructions (2nd Party) 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  
 
In addition to a $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment, you will be paid any money 
you accumulate from the experiment that will be described to you in a moment. You will be paid 
privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an 
experimenter to come to you.  Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules will be asked 
to leave the experiment and will not be paid their earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, payoffs will be expressed in points, not dollars. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points. 
 
In this experiment, there are two types of participants: Participants A and Participants B. The 
computer will randomly and anonymously match participants into groups of two with one 
participant of each type. You will never be informed of the identity of the person with whom you 
are matched, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, the other participant in your group 
will never be informed of your identity. You will be in the same two-person group for the entire 
experiment. 
 
Today’s experiment consists of two stages. Any money that you earn from the experiment will 
be added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment. At the conclusion of the 
second stage, the experiment will end and you will receive your earnings in cash.  
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Stage 1 Instructions 
 
At the beginning of this stage, the participants will receive the following number of points: 
• Participant A: 100 points 
• Participant B: 0 points 
 
In this stage, only Participant A will make a decision. Participant A will decide how many of the 
100 points to give to Participant B. Participant A can give Participant B between 0 and 50 points 
in increments of 10 points. That is, Participant A can choose to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 
points to Participant B. 
 
For example, if Participant A gives 40 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 60 
points (100 – 40) and Participant B will have 40 points (0 + 40) at the end of this stage. If 
Participant A gives 10 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 90 points (100 – 10) 
and Participant B will have 10 points (0 + 10) at the end of this stage. If Participant A gives 
0 points, Participant A will have 100 points and Participant B will have 0 points at the end 
of this stage. 
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Stage 2 Instructions 
 
In this stage, only Participant B will make decisions.  
 
Assigning deduction points 
 
For each possible amount of points that Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1, 
Participant B will decide how many deduction points he or she would like to assign to Participant 
A. Participant B will make these decisions before knowing Participant A’s actual choice in Stage 
1. Participant B can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points to Participant A. For each 
deduction point that Participant B assigns to Participant A, Participant A’s total number of points 
will be reduced by three and Participant B’s total number of points will be reduced by one.  
 
For example, if Participant B assigns 2 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be 
reduced by 6 points (2x3) and Participant B’s total points will be reduced by 2 points. If 
Participant B assigns 19 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be reduced by 57 
points (19x3) and Participant B’s total points will be reduced by 19 points.  
 
Participant B will specify how many deduction points to assign to Participant A, for every 
possible amount that Participant A could give to Participant B in Stage 1. These decisions will be 
made on a screen like the one shown below. 
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Implementing the assignment of deduction points 
 
After Participant B specifies the number of deduction points he or she would like to assign to 
Participant A for each possible decision by Participant A, a die roll will be used to determine 
whether or not Participant B’s decision is actually implemented, and whether any deduction 
points are actually assigned to Participant A. 
 
Participant B’s decision will either  
 
• be implemented, in which case the deduction points specified by Participant B, for the 
amount given by Participant A to Participant B, will be deducted from Participant B’s 
total number of points and three times as many points will be deducted from Participant 
A’s total number of points, or  
 
• not be implemented, in which case no points will be deducted from either Participant B or 
Participant A.  
 
Whether the decision is implemented will depend on a die roll reported by Participant B. 
Participant B will receive a paper cup containing a single six-sided die. Participant B will 
privately roll the die inside the cup, meaning that only Participant B will observe the outcome of 
the die roll. Participant B will then report the outcome of the die roll into the computer.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an even number, meaning it is either 2, 4 or 6, Participant B’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will be 
implemented. That is, Participant B’s total points will be reduced by the specified 
number of deduction points and Participant A’s total points will be reduced by three 
times this amount.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an odd number, meaning it is either 1, 3 or 5, Participant B’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will not be 
implemented. That is, Participant B will keep his or her total points and Participant A’s 
total number of points will not be changed. 
 
  
 
 
31 
Points Calculation 
 
The final number of points for each participant will be calculated as follows: 
 
If Participant B’s reported die roll is a 2, 4, or 6: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
 + 100 (starting points) 
  -  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
-  3 x Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A by Participant B in Stage 2 
for the corresponding decision made by Participant A.  
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
 + Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
-  Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A in Stage 2 for the corresponding 
decision made by Participant A 
 
 
If Participant B’s reported die roll is a 1, 3, or 5: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
+ 100 (starting points) 
-  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
+ Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
 
Your final number of points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points and 
added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment.  
 
Please note that it is possible for Participant A’s and/or Participant B’s total number of points to 
be negative. In this case, the points will be deducted from the participation payment. Additional 
deduction points that would result in net losses greater than the $3 participation payment for 
Participant A or Participant B will not count against the earnings of either Participant A nor 
Participant B.  
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Final Results 
 
All decisions will be made through the computer. After all Stages 1 and 2 have finished, a results 
screen will reveal the following information: 
 
• Participant A’s decision of how many points to give to Participant B in Stage 1. 
• Participant B’s choice of deduction points in Stage 2. 
• Participant B’s reported die roll in Stage 2. 
• Your final number of points. 
• Your total earnings for the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions about the instructions?  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, we will now proceed to some 
questions about the instructions, which you will answer on the computer. You may refer to 
these printed instructions if you need to in order to answer the questions.  
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Appendix: Instructions (3rd Party Control) 
 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  
 
In addition to a $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment, you will be paid any money 
you accumulate from the experiment that will be described to you in a moment. You will be paid 
privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an 
experimenter to come to you.  Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules will be asked 
to leave the experiment and will not be paid their earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, payoffs will be expressed in points, not dollars. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points. 
 
In this experiment, there are three types of participants: Participants A, Participants B, and 
Participants C. The computer will randomly and anonymously match participants into groups of 
three with one participant of each type. You will never be informed of the identity of the two 
people with whom you are matched, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, the two 
other participants in your group will never be informed of your identity. You will be in the same 
three-person group for the entire experiment. 
 
Today’s experiment consists of two stages. Any money that you earn from the experiment will 
be added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment. At the conclusion of the 
second stage, the experiment will end and you will receive your earnings in cash.  
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Stage 1 Instructions 
 
At the beginning of this stage, the participants will receive the following number of points: 
• Participant A: 100 points 
• Participant B: 0 points 
• Participant C: 50 points 
 
In this stage, only Participant A will make a decision. Participant A will decide how many of the 
100 points to give to Participant B. Participant A can give Participant B between 0 and 50 points 
in increments of 10 points. That is, Participant A can choose to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 
points to Participant B. 
 
For example, if Participant A gives 40 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 60 
points (100 – 40) and Participant B will have 40 points (0 + 40) at the end of this stage. If 
Participant A gives 10 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 90 points (100 – 10) 
and Participant B will have 10 points (0 + 10) at the end of this stage. If Participant A gives 
0 points, Participant A will have 100 points and Participant B will have 0 points at the end 
of this stage. 
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Stage 2 Instructions 
 
In this stage, only Participant C will make decisions.  
 
Assigning deduction points 
 
For each possible amount of points that Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1, 
Participant C will decide how many deduction points he or she would like to assign to Participant 
A. Participant C will make these decisions before knowing Participant A’s actual choice in Stage 
1. Participant C can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points to Participant A. For each 
deduction point that Participant C assigns to Participant A, Participant A’s total number of points 
will be reduced by three and Participant C’s total number of points will be reduced by one.  
 
For example, if Participant C assigns 2 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be 
reduced by 6 points (2x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 2 points. If 
Participant C assigns 19 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be reduced by 57 
points (19x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 19 points.  
 
Participant C will specify how many deduction points to assign to Participant A, for every 
possible amount that Participant A could give to Participant B in Stage 1. These decisions will be 
made on a screen like the one shown below. 
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Implementing the assignment of deduction points 
 
After Participant C specifies the number of deduction points he or she would like to assign to 
Participant A for each possible decision by Participant A, a die roll will be used to determine 
whether or not Participant C’s decision is actually implemented, and whether any deduction 
points are actually assigned to Participant A. 
 
Participant C’s decision will either  
 
• be implemented, in which case the deduction points specified by Participant C, for the 
amount given by Participant A to Participant B, will be deducted from Participant C’s 
total number of points and three times as many points will be deducted from Participant 
A’s total number of points, or  
 
• not be implemented, in which case no points will be deducted from either Participant C or 
Participant A.  
 
Whether the decision is implemented will depend on a die roll by Participant C. Participant C 
will receive a paper cup containing a single six-sided die. The experimenter will observe 
Participant C roll the die and the experimenter will then enter the outcome of the die roll into the 
computer.  
 
• If the die roll is an even number, meaning it is either 2, 4 or 6, Participant C’s decision 
about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will be implemented. That 
is, Participant C’s 50 points will be reduced by the specified number of deduction points 
and Participant A’s total points will be reduced by three times this amount.  
 
• If the die roll is an odd number, meaning it is either 1, 3 or 5, Participant C’s decision 
about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will not be implemented. 
That is, Participant C will keep his or her entire 50 points and Participant A’s total 
number of points will not be changed. 
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Points Calculation 
 
The final number of points for each participant will be calculated as follows: 
 
If Participant C’s die roll is a 2, 4, or 6: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
 + 100 (starting points) 
  -  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
-  3 x Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A by Participant C in Stage 2 
for the corresponding decision made by Participant A.  
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
 + Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
 + 50 (starting points) 
-  Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A in Stage 2 for the corresponding 
decision made by Participant A 
 
 
If Participant C’s die roll is a 1, 3, or 5: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
+ 100 (starting points) 
-  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
+ Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
+ 50 (starting points) 
 
Your final number of points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points and 
added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment.  
 
Please note that it is possible for Participant A’s total number of points to be negative. In this 
case, the points will be deducted from Participant A’s participation payment. Additional 
deduction points that would result in net losses greater than the $3 participation payment for 
Participant A will not count against the earnings of either Participant A nor Participant C.  
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Final Results 
 
All decisions will be made through the computer. After all Stages 1 and 2 have finished, a results 
screen will reveal the following information: 
 
• Participant A’s decision of how many points to give to Participant B in Stage 1. 
• Participant C’s choice of deduction points in Stage 2. 
• Participant C’s die roll in Stage 2. 
• Your final number of points. 
• Your total earnings for the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions about the instructions?  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, we will now proceed to some 
questions about the instructions, which you will answer on the computer. You may refer to 
these printed instructions if you need to in order to answer the questions.  
 
 
 
